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Abstract In this article, we discuss some of the recent proposals developed by
Bruno Frey for making future societies more democratic and prosperous. While
sharing Frey’s conviction that new ways of involving citizens in political decision-
making in representative democracies are needed, we engage in debate on his
proposals on voting rights, referenda and randomized decision-making. We are
critical of the random selection of office-holders proposed by Frey, suggesting it
may lead to alienation by citizens from the political process and would not really
address the perceptional gap between elites and the broader public. Mindful of the
pitfalls inherent in the increasing use of referenda, we suggest pre-referendum
deliberation rather than the post-referendum conciliation proposed by Frey. Fur-
thermore, we believe that it is almost impossible to propose good solutions without
engaging the different arguments and empirical findings exploring the substantive as
well as the procedural causes of democratic discontent.
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1 Introduction
In his article ‘Proposals for a democracy of the future’ Bruno Frey (2017) develops
a number of ideas and specific proposals for making future societies more
democratic and prosperous. He argues that direct citizen participation makes
democracies stronger and citizens more satisfied and outlines how participation can
be improved via nine different routes. His proposals include, among others,
introducing weighted voting rights based on length of residence, holding referenda
that include post referenda conciliation procedures, and using random procedures in
elections for public bodies.
We share Frey’s conviction that there is a need for new ways of involving
citizens in political decision-making in representative democracies. Many of his
proposals break new ground, while developing themes which have been prominent
in his work. Next to their original contribution, these proposals represent an opening
for further debate. We would like to enter this debate and discuss some of the
potential pitfalls and limitations of the proposals. We also suggest some alternative
ways to advance citizen participation.
We agree with Frey’s observation that recently we have witnessed unprecedented
attacks against existing democracy. We would go even further by claiming that we
have entered a period of discontent with democracy in its current form which affects
even the most stable and developed democracies in the world. While for Frey the
exploration of the possibilities of direct participation is a long-lasting research
interest, current developments in the world make his contribution particularly
interesting and topical. The question is, however, whether the remedies that are
offered are the right medicine for the current malaise of democratic discontent. We
start with some general observations before discussing several of Frey’s proposals in
more detail.
A first general observation we would like to make is that a contribution based on
public choice and limited to institutional adjustments may leave some of the most
important causes of current citizen discontent, based on actual outputs of democratic
polities, unrecognized and unacknowledged. It suffices here to mention debates
about rising inequality and its effects, as exemplified in the much-discussed work of
Piketty (2014) or the increasingly rich and nuanced debates about the effects of
globalization in creating new cleavages between cosmopolitan and nation bound
citizens (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). Naturally, debates about these causes are far from
conclusive. Nevertheless, we believe that a discussion of possible changes in the
organization of decision making and citizen inputs in democracies should take into
account the substantive causes of the ‘democratic discontent’ or the discontent with
democracy.
Identifying the factors that have made developed democracies highly vulnerable
to discontent at this point in history remains a difficult task and a long process of
scientific discovery. Debates about causes can be strongly politicized and influenced
by the values and preferences of observers. Frey avoids this trap by not taking much
of a stand on the causes of the current crisis of democracy in substantive terms, but
this leads to his core assumption that citizen preferences are procedural rather than
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substantive. Yet the assumption that public discontent is rooted in a lack of voice
and influence over decision making rather than in the substantive outputs of decision
making in currently existing democracies needs to be examined more carefully and
supported by more data than he currently presents. We question whether the
possibility of (more) voting can make people more satisfied: it is possible that the
increased satisfaction of migrants when they become Swiss citizens, which Frey
cites as an example of the increased participation effects on happiness, could have
other causes, for example the improved access to public goods, services and to job
opportunities which citizens have in comparison to non-citizens.
A second observation is that public choice analyses sometimes tend to build on
existing governance structures that are treated as ‘given’ in the analysis. One should
not forget that the very institutions that make collective decision-making possible
are based on political choices as well, which makes these institutions, to some
extent, endogenous to the analysis. Here we encounter the well-known problem of
institutions as ‘relative’ constants, extensively discussed by Riker (1980).
Introducing political costs to decrease the likelihood of changing institutions as
compared to ordinary political decisions creates stability. Another way of
strengthening this relative stability is by focusing on the underlying values in
society that form the foundation of democratic systems. Commonly shared
understandings about the desirability of democracy as a political system, legitimacy
of its institutions and decision-making procedures, form a stable foundation for
collective decision-making. This, however, requires a continuous confirmation of
societal consensus and the shared core values in daily politics. It is an open question
whether some of the suggested solutions will indeed, as intended, strengthen
democracy and improve citizen participation, or could, potentially, contribute to a
gradual erosion of some of these values.
Following our general observations, we now discuss some of Frey’s specific
proposals on voting rights, referenda and randomized decision-making.
2 Voting Rights
The rising number of studies showing the emergence of a new cleavage between
mobile citizens and those whose rights and livelihood are protected by national
borders also discuss the transformation of political landscapes in Western
democracies linked to this development (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). Frey’s proposal
for having a voting share proportional to time spent in a jurisdiction—although
perhaps difficult to administer—allows for some redressing of the imbalance
between mobile and less mobile citizens in terms of the rights and public goods they
enjoy. This proposal may prove tremendously controversial for cosmopolitan
citizens of Europe or the world, but might, if implemented, address the problem of
voters influencing polities and policies away from the place where they actually live
and pay taxes.
In our view, Frey takes a ‘material’ instead of ‘formal’ perspective on citizenship
and public participation by making voting rights dependent on the time spent in
residence. We agree that in our increasingly more mobile societies in which
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individuals from other countries live, work and benefit from local and national
public goods and services, a formal perspective on voting rights does not suffice. It
deconstructs the logical triangle between enjoying public goods, the obligation to
pay for these through taxation and the possibility (e.g. right) to decide on different
quantities, if one wishes. The latter, however, is, at least in the European Union,
only made possible in local and European elections. For national elections ‘formal’
citizenship is still key. So, it is no surprise, that from an economic perspective and
possibly also from a normative one, this arrangement is no longer optimal. By
giving all users of public services a say in its production through elections, they all
may be better off. This would indeed require a change towards ‘material’ citizenship
as Frey proposes.
The same logic can be applied to the position of another group of residents, who
may have too generous rights. These are the holders of double citizenship: people
who, for whatever reason, have double passports. Mostly these are citizens who
have lived for a long period in one country and obtained citizenship, but are also
still citizens of another country based on national law. To put it differently, these
residents have ‘formal’ and ‘material’ citizenship in their country of residence and
still ‘formal’ citizenship in another country. These voters may have little connection
with the political developments and discussions in the country where they do not
live but can vote. It does not seem reasonable for them to be still in a position to
determine public policy in their original country of citizenship. The diaspora may
even be asked to vote on the shape of the polity, as in the case of constitutional
changes proposed in the Turkish constitutional referendum of April 2017. If a
citizen is not likely to experience the effects of decision making in a political system
or does not pay (full) taxes, why should this person be in a position to determine
policies or institutions?
One pragmatic way of introducing weighted or material voting rights to European
citizens would be to connect such proposals to the EU’s Residence Directive (2004/
38) in which residency rights of European citizens in other EU countries are
arranged. Basically, after 5 years of living in another EU country, EU nationals
acquire the right of permanent residence. This right should also involve voting
rights, in the country of residence—at the expense of the voting rights in the country
of origin. Based on the already existing legal framework, having only voting rights
as a permanent resident in another EU country might be feasible. A serious
drawback of such a change, however, would be the complexity involved in securing
adequate representation based on residence: tracking how much time a citizen
spends in a specific jurisdiction. The arrangements for non-EU citizens would be
even more complicated, as they would require bilateral arrangements between the
member states of the EU and other countries that also may have an interest in
moving to ‘material’ forms of citizenship. Finally, tracking how much time citizens
spend in one jurisdiction as opposed to another may in itself have adverse effects on
personal freedom and thereby on citizen satisfaction with democracy.
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3 Referenda
Referenda have long been seen as an obvious tool to get citizens involved in
policymaking, especially in representative democracies. In his work, Frey has often
recommended referenda as a way to involve citizens in key decisions of their polity,
not only to articulate voter preferences, but also ‘‘… to break up the politicians’
coalition against voters’’ (Frey 1992, p. 218; see also Frey and Bohnet 1993, p. 72).
Interestingly, since then, many countries have held ad hoc consultative referenda on
important political decisions or even introduced legislation allowing citizens to
initiate referenda. For example, in 2003, eight candidate countries from Central and
Eastern Europe organized referenda asking citizens to approve their accession to the
EU, which resulted in overwhelming support to the ‘yes’ camp.1
There are also less glorious examples, among them the recent Dutch referendum
on the European Association Agreement with the Ukraine which we have closely
observed. Held in April 2016, this referendum had a turnout of 32% of the voters,
61% of which voted ‘against’ the ratification of the agreement.2 Although the
referendum was consultative, after the vote a majority of members of parliament
indicated that they could not ignore the result, while initially they had voted to ratify
the agreement. Eventually, under high international pressure, Dutch Prime Minister
Rutte negotiated a declaration added to the Agreement in which some of the
concerns raised during the referendum campaign were addressed (e.g., the so-called
membership perspective for Ukraine). Having adopted the declaration at an EU
summit, it was possible to find a new majority in the second chamber in favor of
ratifying the agreement.3 Following these experiences with the first application of
the Dutch law on referenda, the State Council, an important advisory body for the
Dutch government, warned about the polarizing effect of referenda. The advice
highlighted the tension between this instrument and the rule of law (Raad van State
2017, p. 17).
In our view referenda are, in general, a rather crude way of identifying what
voters like. As explained elsewhere (Steunenberg 1992), ‘yes–no’ type of voting
prevents voters from expressing any view more nuanced than the answer to the
question on the ballot. Furthermore, the possibility that others may like a ‘third’
option, not included in the take-it-or-leave-it vote, may lead to the alienation of that
group of voters. Some voters, simply, may not want to vote since they do not like
either option. That was arguably the case with some of the Dutch voters who
1 Ranging between 66.8% approval in Estonia to 93.7 in Slovakia and 91.9% in Lithuania. Malta also
held a referendum in 2003 in which 53.6% of citizens voted for accession. Later, in the second wave of
the Eastern enlargement, Bulgaria and Romania refrained from putting the decision to accede to the EU to
the popular vote.
2 Survey research after the referendum (Jacobs et al. 2016) identified the main concerns among the
opponents to be the (perceived) corruption in Ukraine and the idea that the country would become, at
some point, a candidate for EU membership as a consequence of the agreement. Interestingly, only 23.8%
of the voters found that the topic was suitable for a referendum.
3 The treaty is not yet ratified as the First Chamber still had to vote for ratification at the time of writing.
For a more detailed account, see F. Lambie and S. Koole ‘Reconstructie Oekraine-referendum: Hoe de
nee-stem een ja wordt’ online at RTLNieuws, 4/11/2016. (https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nederland/politiek/
reconstructie-oekraine-referendum-hoe-de-nee-stem-een-ja-wordt).
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abstained from participation in the referendum on the Ukraine agreement.4 Last but
by no means least, the binary nature of referendum decisions results in ‘winner-
take-all’ politics, where the views of the minority are not represented at all (and
sometimes, as in the case of the Brexit referendum, this can be quite a substantial
minority). In this sense, referenda also lead to much more polarization in society
than parliamentary elections where provisions to take minorities and their views into
account have evolved with time.
The other important question which arises after the narrow victories in important
recent referenda is what to do with the (substantial) remaining minority and their
views. This is a crucial issue, as in the case of the above mentioned Dutch
referendum,5 or in the Brexit referendum,6 the results had an immediate political
impact. Winning parties often claim that their victory puts all possible nuance aside.
In view of such developments, Frey’s plea is to bring minority views into the
discussion about policy consequences after a referendum is held. He proposes that
all parties involved in referenda respect minority views and enter into a discussion
to seek an acceptable compromise. But does the referendum as a tool then not bite
its own tail? There are pitfalls here for both leaders and voters. For leaders, we
wonder how many are capable of starting serious negotiations with the ‘losing’
parties after winning a popular majority vote. Polarization among voters is often at a
high following a referendum campaign: accommodating both ‘winners’ and ‘losers’
would seem like a ‘betrayal’ of the referendum promise. As we know, in the UK,
Cameron could not start a debate on compromise on Brexit since he had
campaigned for the yes vote, and in Italy, former Prime Minister Renzi resigned
after the Italian ‘no’ to his proposed constitutional reforms. Not so many are willing
to take the risky political path Dutch Prime Minister Rutte took in bending the
Dutch ‘no’ into ratification.
In order to address these problems and issues, we suggest that if referenda are
used on a regular basis, there should be a (possibly compulsory) pre-referendum
deliberation instead of a post referendum debate as suggested by Frey. We suggest
that any referenda should be preceded and always accompanied by formal
deliberation (i.e., similar to citizen assembles in Ireland) ensuring that citizens are
provided with both the information and the arguments that would facilitate coming
to a decision. By carefully discussing the various options within a structured setting
which would be part of the referendum’s institutional arrangement, voters can
clarify what a referendum should be about or be informed by experts about the
issues or policies at stake. In addition, we suggest that only voters who have
participated in the deliberation rounds, would have the right to cast a vote. In a
similar vein, the proposals developed by Dryzek and his collaborators (e.g., Dryzek
4 Others have reportedly abstained strategically in order to lower turnout below the 30% threshold, which
would have made the referendum invalid.
5 Based on the total population of voters, only 19.7% of the voters voted against, 12.3% was in favor and
67.8% did not vote in the Ukraine referendum. By comparison, in the 2017 Dutch national elections,
81.9% of the voters went to the ballot box
6 In the Brexit referendum 72.2% of the voters went to the ballot box: 51.9% voted leave and 48.1%
remain (or, based on the total population of voters, 37.5% voted leave, 34.7% remain, and 27.8% did not
vote)
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and Niemeyer 2008) for experimenting with various forms of deliberation in
addition to existing democratic procedures, would allow citizens to form informed
opinions of local issues and problems, but also to express their emotional responses,
motivations and aspirations. This is far from current practice where a limited
number of signatures can trigger a call to parliament to organize a referendum over
a very short period of time.
We support Frey’s recommendation that referenda should be combined with
deliberation focusing on potential consequences and possible compromises between
the different positions and sides of a proposition. However, we realize that to
accommodate citizens who may perceive themselves as losers from a specific policy
can be quite hard. We believe deliberation can only help if citizens have specific
value or utility based judgments on the policy in question, which are open to
compromise. This is not always the case, as Dryzek and Braithwaite have shown in
their analysis of the relation between discourses, political arguments and underlying
values (Dryzek and Braithwaite 2000). A compromise between different positions,
they suggest, is only possible on the basis of value-laden or informed judgements. If
the preferred outcome is supported by a discontent-based, value-free discourse, even
if others have value-based arguments, deliberation is likely to lead only to
‘dogmatic reassertions of positions’ (Dryzek and Braithwaite 2000, p. 262).
Therefore, we can expect that in the case of majorities based on discontent rather
than values, referenda might create more instability in political systems because
they would contribute to further polarization.
In addition, the use of referenda as a tool of getting citizen approval for specific
policies, may, in fact, lead to an exacerbation of a cleavage that is becomingin-
creasingly problematic in present day democracies: the gap between educated and
less educated citizens. Analyses of several recent electoral outcomes that have
involved politicians with a populist bent (such as Donald Trump in the US or the
Brexit vote in the UK) show clear divisions between citizens based on educational
status. Education influences not only how people vote, but, perhaps more
fundamentally, access to education also influences income and the health of
citizens. The question is whether increased use of referenda, without pre-
referendum deliberation on the proposed (policy) decisions, would lead to decisions
exacerbating this cleavage.
4 Randomized Decision-Making
A third route proposed in Frey’s paper is to introduce random procedures in
decision-making and voter representation. Especially in the case of representation,
the procedure of election by lot, would give, in Frey’s view, every citizen an equal
probability of becoming a member of parliament, a minister or president.
This would be a solution possibly more valuable in theory than in practice due to
limitations randomly selected citizens may face in terms of competences and
commitment. In terms of competences, checks-and-balances would still be in place,
limiting the power of randomly selected officials, and requiring them to seek
compromise and make deals with others. Running for public office may in itself
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help candidates acquire these vital skills. In terms of commitment, many people
may not be interested in serving as a representative or government member, given
the tremendous effort and time investment required. Local parties in the
Netherlands, for example, face great difficulties in finding candidates that are
willing to combine the rather time-consuming membership of municipal councils
with their daily affairs.
Nevertheless, randomized decision-making seems an elegant way of closing the
persistent gap between elites and the general public. If elites are not a fixed and
defined group but can be constituted by random procedure, then citizens would
presumably not feel that a privileged group they do not belong to has a
disproportionate role in determining the course of politics and society. Having
ordinary citizens participate in the political process based on random selection may
strengthen the idea among the general public that decisions are not made by ‘them’
but by ‘us’.
Yet we believe that the introduction of random draws, especially with regard to
voter representation, will not strengthen democracy. First, it is not clear whether
citizens would identify themselves to a greater extent with randomly selected
citizens than with elected representatives. Research shows that in many countries
the identification of voters with established political parties is very limited (Dalton
2013). It is rather unlikely that voters would identify with randomly chosen leaders
either.
Second, and more importantly, in any democracy, the principles of input,
deliberative and procedural legitimacy are important. It is crucial that all citizens
share the belief that they can participate in democratic deliberation, are allowed to
decide or vote, and recognize that outcomes are selected based on a set of
commonly understood and clear rules. Based on these principles, citizens are willing
to accept democratic decision-making, even if they do not agree with it.
Random procedures violate some of these fundamental principles. Having
decision makers selected by the luck of the draw can be perceived by citizens who
were not selected as formal exclusion from the political process.
This solution would, in our view, increase existing cleavages between groups in
society and potentially also between elites (in the case of random selection those
who have decided on an issue) and the rest.
The dissatisfaction of those who are not selected to public office may increase
even further, eroding the common understanding on what democratic rules are
about. In addition, selection by lot could lead to further alienation from the political
process because citizens would realize that they have no influence on the outcome.
This path leads us back to Riker’s dilemma about the relative stability of institutions
compared to political decisions (Riker 1980). If people start to doubt the fairness of
democratic rules, it will be near impossible to maintain democracy as a model of
collective decision-making. Therefore, we disagree with Frey that random
procedures applied to election to political bodies would improve inclusiveness
and fairness. We believe they would not have the same impact on legitimacy as the
simple one-man–one-vote rule, or, more generally, the idea of equal political rights
for all citizens. Making use of those procedures may even be detrimental if the
openness of the democratic process to everyone is diminished.
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5 Conclusions
The debates about the nature of the problems present-day democracies experience
with citizen participation and satisfaction will undoubtedly gather further momen-
tum and become more polarized in the coming years and decades. Frey’s proposals
are a welcome contribution to these debates. In our view, scholars should take a
critical but independent position in this debate, as Frey does with his proposals. We
do believe, however, that it is almost impossible to propose good solutions without
engaging the different arguments and empirical findings and exploring the
substantive as well as procedural causes of democratic discontent.
In addition to arguing for a closer link of the proposed solutions to the actual
causes of citizen dissatisfaction, we propose some modifications and critical notes to
some of Frey’s specific proposals. In particular, we disagree with Frey on the use of
referenda and random representation in collective decision-making. Concerning
referenda, our critique focuses on the polarizing effects of referenda and our
expectation that they have the potential to exacerbate cleavages between minorities
and majorities and between educated and less educated voters. Furthermore, they
may lead to unsustainable public policies and outcomes that might increase voter
dissatisfaction even further. Frey’s suggestion for post referendum deliberation on
the decided policy goes some way to amend the problem, but in our view
deliberation can only work as a pre-decision procedure and not a post referendum
afterthought. The debates about Brexit which took place after the Brexit vote seem
to illustrate the futility and polarizing nature of post referendum discussions.
With respect to random representation, we argue that random selection will
inevitably make non-selected citizens feel excluded from the political process. Even
if they have on average the same likelihood to be selected and provide input to the
political process, this will be much harder to understand and explain than the simple
one-man–one-vote concept. In this way, random procedures will not be perceived as
satisfying the basic principles of equality, and therefore may increase perceived
inequality. As democracy is also about what citizens consider to be the ‘right’ rules
and procedures, randomization may erode citizens’ recognition of legitimate
decision-making.
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